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TOBACCO SUITS TODAY: ARE CIGARETTE PLAINTIFFS JUST
BLOWING SMOKE?
I. INTRODUCTION
The Surgeon General has stated that cigarette smoking is the "chief,
single, avoidable cause of death in our society and the most important
public health issue of our time."' Over 200,000 people die each year in the
United States as a result of cigarette smoking.2 Consequently, numerous
products liability suits have been ified against tobacco companies.,3 How-
ever, until the 1988 decision in CipoIlone v. Liggett Group, Inc.,4 no
plaintiff had won a products liability suit against a tobacco company.5
The first wave of suits by cigarette smokers began in the 1950s. Al-
though these suits were brought under a variety of legal theories,6 none of
the plaintiffs were victorious. 7 Cigarette manufacturers consistently
avoided liability, primarily by claiming lack of foreseeability of the harm-
ful effects of smoking,8 showing that cigarettes were reasonably fit for
1. Note, Plaintiffs' Conduct as a Defense to Claims Against Cigarette Manufacturers,
99 HARv. L. REV. 809, 810 n.5 (1986) (quoting Koop, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN
SERVS., THE HEALTH CONSEQUENCES OF SMOKING: CANCER: A REPORT OF THE SURGEON GEN-
ERAL, at xi (1982)).
2. Rust, Smoke Alarms, 7 CAL. LAW. 22, 25 (Oct. 1987). In comparison, car accidents are
responsible for only 40,000 deaths per year. Id.
3. Approximately 100 cases are currently pending. Rosenblum, Tobacco Trials Still
Costly, Analysts Say, 121 NEW JERSEY L.J. 1369 (1988).
4. 693 F. Supp. 208 (D.N.J. 1988).
5. Rust, supra note 2, at 22.
6. See, e.g., Lartigue v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 317 F.2d 19 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
375 U.S. 865 (1963) (breach of implied warranty of fitness and negligence); Green v. Ameri-
can Tobacco Co., 304 F.2d 70 (5th Cir. 1962), question certified, 154 So. 2d 169 (Fla.), rev'd
and remanded on rehg, 325 F.2d 673 (5th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 943 (1964),
rev'd and remanded, 391 F.2d 97 (5th Cir. 1968), aff'd per curiam on reh'g en banc, 409
F.2d 1166 (5th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 911 (1970) (breach of implied warranty of
fitness); Pritchard v. Liggett & Myers Tobacco Co., 295 F.2d 292 (3d Cir. 1961) (breach of
implied warranty of fitness and negligent failure to warn); Cooper v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco
Co., 234 F.2d 170 (1st Cir. 1956), remanded and reh'g granted, 256 F.2d 464 (1st Cir. 1958),
cert. denied, 358 U.S. 875 (1958) (fraud by false advertising); Albright v. R.J. Reynolds
Tobacco Co., 350 F. Supp. 341 (W.D. Pa. 1972), aff'd without opinion, 485 F.2d 678 (3d Cir.
1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 951 (1974) (products liability).
7. Reasons given for these failures include favorable legal rulings and tenacious defense
work. Garner, Cigarette Dependency and Civil Liability: A Modest Proposal, 53 S. CAL. L.
REV. 1423, 1425 (1980).
8. See, e.g., Green v. American Tobacco Co., 304 F.2d 70, 76 (5th Cir. 1962) ("defendant
could not be held liable as an absolute insurer against consequences of which no developed
human skill and foresight could afford knowledge"); accord Ross v. Philip Morris & Co., 328
F.2d 3, 10 (8th Cir. 1964) (cigarette manufacturer liable only if harmful effects of cigarettes
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their intended use,9 and by asserting affirmative defenses, ° most often
assumption of risk.
Undaunted by the failures of earlier plaintiffs, smokers began a second
wave of suits in the 1980s. The predominant claim by modern plaintiffs
has been that tobacco companies either failed to warn or inadequately
warned the public of the risks associated with cigarette smoking.1 In re-
sponse, the tobacco industry has repeatedly claimed that failure to warn
claims are preempted by the Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising
Act,'2 (the "Act") which requires warnings on all cigarette packages. Only
one court has held that claims based on injuries caused by smoking after
1966, when warnings were effected under the Act, are not preempted."
Every other modern court presented with this issue, including the court
in Cipollone, has ruled that these claims are preempted by the Act. The
unified judicial position on this issue is discouraging for present and fu-
ture plaintiffs since a finding of preemption effectively bars many claims.
In addition, a finding of preemption requires an apportionment of proof
and damages between injuries caused by pre-1966 smoking and post-1966
smoking. As more time passes since the Act's adoption, plaintiffs should
have an increasingly difficult time proving that their injuries were in fact
caused by pre-1966 smoking. Furthermore, if a plaintiff continued to
smoke after 1966, the cigarette manufacturer may assert an assumption of
risk defense by claiming that continued smoking after being specifically
warned of the dangers indicates a voluntary encountering of a known risk.
As a consequence, the probability of an unsuccessful suit increases.
This Note explores the historical development of the present suits
against cigarette manufacturers, and analyzes them in light of the Federal
Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act and current theories of liability.
An examination of current theories, including failure to warn and breach
of express warranty, supports the conclusion that the victory for the
plaintiffs in Cipollone is not as promising as it initially appears.
II. THE EVOLUTION OF CURRENT SUITS AGAINST CIGARET
MANUFACTURERS
A. The Early Cases
In the 1950s and 1960s cigarette smokers began bringing suits against
cigarette manufacturers seeking to recover damages for injuries allegedly
could have been anticipated by use of developed human skill or foresight).
9. See, e.g., Lartigue, 317 F.2d at 39.
10. See, e.g., Pritchard v. Liggett & Myers Tobacco Co., 350 F.2d 479, 481 (3d Cir. 1965).
11. See, e.g., Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 593 F. Supp. 1146, 1149 (D.N.J. 1984),
rev'd in part and remanded, 789 F.2d 181 (3d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 487 (1987).
12. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1331-1340 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
13. See Forster v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 423 N.W.2d 691 (Minn. Ct. App. 1988).
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caused by smoking the defendant manufacturer's cigarettes. A variety of
legal theories of liability were used in these suits including fraud, negli-
gence, and breach of warranty.14 Of all the suits brought, not a single
plaintiff prevailed, nor did a single manufacturer settle a case.15 Instead,
the nature of the plaintiffs' theories allowed manufacturers to consist-
ently prevail by asserting either lack of foreseeability or an affirmative
defense such as assumption of risk."'
The judicial climate encountered by the earlier plaintiffs was unfavora-
ble, since the theories of liability they used required them to overcome
evidentiary burdens which they were consistently unable to meet. Three
early cases alleging breach of warranty illustrate the typical problems en-
countered. In Lartigue v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co.,17 Ross v. Philip
Morris & Co.,' and Hudson v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co.,19 the circuit
courts consistently found in favor of the manufacturer. Since plaintiffs
often alleged that the manufacturer's cigarettes were not fit for their in-
tended use,20 in order to recover, plaintiffs had to show that defendants
knew or should have known that cigarettes were unsafe products which
should be taken off the market.21 Since the hazards of cigarette smoking
arguably were not widely recognized at the time of these early suits,
courts were reluctant to transform cigarette manufacturers into insurers
or to proclaim cigarettes unreasonably unsafe. In these early cases, ciga-
rette manufacturers primarily avoided liability by claiming unforeseeabil-
ity of the cancer-causing effects of their products.
In Lartigue, the Fifth Circuit stated that "it cannot be said that ciga-
rette smokers who started smoking before the great cancer-smoking de-
bate relied on the tobacco companies' 'warranty' that their cigarettes had
no carcinogenic element. Today, the manufacturer is not an insurer
14. See, e.g., Ross v. Philip Morris & Co., 328 F.2d 3 (8th Cir. 1964) (breach of implied
warranty, negligence, fraud and deceit by false advertising); Lartigue v. R.J. Reynolds To-
bacco Co., 317 F.2d 19 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 865 (1963) (breach of implied war-
ranty of fitness, negligence); Pritchard v. Liggett & Myers Tobacco Co., 295 F.2d 292 (3d
Cir. 1961), rev'd and remanded, 350 F.2d 479 (3d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 987
(1966), modified per curiam, 370 F.2d 95 (3d Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 1009 (1967)
(breach of implied warranty, negligence).
15. "Two hundred cases have been disposed of with no award." Rust, supra note 2, at
22.
16. See infra notes 47-84 and accompanying text.
17. 317 F.2d 19 (5th Cir. 1963).
18. 328 F.2d 3 (8th Cir. 1964).
19. 427 F.2d 541 (5th Cir. 1970).
20. E.g., Ross, 328 F.2d at 7; Lartigue, 317 F.2d at 23.
21. The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals found that cigarettes were reasonably fit for the
purpose for which they were sold. See Green v. American Tobacco Co., 304 F.2d 70 (5th Cir.
1962), question certified, 154 So. 2d 169 (Fla. 1963), rev'd and remanded on reh'g, 325 F.2d
673 (5th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 943 (1964), rev'd and remanded, 391 F.2d 97 (5th
Cir. 1968), aff'd per curiam on reh'g en banc, 409 F.2d 1166 (5th Cir. 1969), cert. denied,
397 U.S. 911 (1970).
1989]
260 UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 23:257
against the unknowable."22 Similarly, in Hudson, the Fifth Circuit found
for the manufacturer since the plaintiff failed to prove the foreseeability
of the risks inherent in cigarette smoking.23 In Ross, the Eighth Circuit
held that when no developed human skill or foresight could afford knowl-
edge of the relationship between cancer and smoking, state law would not
hold the defendant absolutely liable as an insurer.
2 4
The foreseeability factor clearly contributed to the courts' reticence to
hold tobacco companies liable as insurers. However, two cases of this era
provided glimmers of hope for plaintiff recovery. Presaging current theo-
ries of liability, the plaintiff in Pritchard v. Liggett & Myers Tobacco
Co.25 alleged negligent failure to warn and breach of implied warranty.
26
Specifically, Pritchard argued that Liggett & Myers was negligent in fail-
ing to warn him that certain substances alleged to cause cancer were pre-
sent in Chesterfield cigarettes." Despite expert testimony that a relation-
ship between lung cancer and heavy smoking had been noted for many
years prior to 1953,28 the jury found on retrial that Liggett & Myers was
not negligent in failing to warn Pritchard of the risk of contracting can-
cer.29 In the first trial, the Third Circuit held that the facts supported the
finding of a manufacturer's warranty of merchantability and of fitness for
use "that Chesterfield cigarettes were reasonably fit and generally in-
tended for smoking without causing physical injury."30 Thus recovery
under a warranty theory may have been possible. However, this line of
proof was not pursued by the plaintiff.3 '
In Green v. American Tobacco Co.,32 the issue of fitness for use resur-
22. Lartigue, 317 F.2d at 39-40. For the problems a plaintiff encounters when attempting
to show his reliance on a manufacturer's warranties, see infra notes 74-80 and accompanying
text.
23. Hudson, 427 F.2d at 542.
24. Ross, 328 F.2d at 10.
25. 295 F.2d 292 (3d Cir. 1961), rev'd and remanded, 350 F.2d 479 (3d Cir. 1965), cert.
denied, 382 U.S. 987 (1966), modified per curiam, 370 F.2d 95 (3d Cir. 1966), cert. denied,
386 U.S. 1009 (1967).
26. Pritchard, 295 F.2d at 296, 299.
27. Id. at 299.
28. Id. at 299-300.
29. Pritchard, 350 F.2d at 482.
30. Pritchard, 295 F.2d at 296.
31. The case may have been won on a theory of implied warranty; however, the plaintiff
did not pursue a new trial, claiming that the problems of proof were "insurmountable."
Garner, supra note 7, at 1427-28.
32. 304 F.2d 70 (5th Cir. 1962), question certified, 154 So. 2d 169 (Fla.), rev'd and re-
manded on reh'g 325 F.2d 673 (5th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 943 (1964), rev'd and
remanded, 391 F.2d 97 (5th Cir. 1968), aff'd per curiam on reh'g en banc, 409 F.2d 1166
(5th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 911 (1970). Appropriately, Green has been called "the
longest and most nearly successful battle to hold a cigarette company liable for cigarette
induced death and disability." Garner, supra note 7, at 1423. The litigation in Green took
twelve years and included six appeals and two jury trials. Id.
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faced. The jury found that Green's lung cancer was proximately caused
by smoking Lucky Strikes, but rendered a verdict for American Tobacco
because it could not have reasonably foreseen that smokers were in dan-
ger. 33 Although the ultimate resolution of the case was in favor of Ameri-
can Tobacco, Green provided a ray of hope for plaintiffs when, after a
second trial, the Fifth Circuit reversed the jury verdict for American To-
bacco, and held that Green was entitled to rely on implied assurances
that the cigarettes were wholesome and reasonably fit for their intended
purpose.3 4 Therefore, American Tobacco could be held absolutely liable
for Green's death.35 Unfortunately for plaintiffs, this finding of liability
was short-lived: the Fifth Circuit later overruled its own reversal and held
for American Tobacco. Based in part on the absence of any Florida deci-
sion holding a manufacturer liable where there was no defect or adultera-
tion in the product, the court reinstated earlier jury findings. Since it had
previously been established that the Lucky Strikes smoked by Green were
not adulterated nor more dangerous than other cigarette brands, the
could held that cigarettes were reasonably fit and wholesome for the pur-
pose for which they were sold and that the implied warranty did not in-
clude harmful effects that could not be foreseen.8
B. The Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act
Against a backdrop of consumer and judicial uncertainty regarding the
risks associated with smoking, Congress promulgated the Federal Ciga-
rette Labeling and Advertising Act.3 7 In response to a growing awareness
of the health threat posed to Americans, the Act was aimed at regulating
the labeling and advertising of cigarettes. Originally adopted in 1965, the
Act required that a cautionary legend appear on all packages of cigarettes
reading: "Caution: Cigarette Smoking May be Hazardous to Your
Health." 38 The congressional purpose of the Act was to adequately inform
the public of the health risks associated with cigarette smoking and to
ensure that this information was disseminated clearly through uniform
labeling.39 In addition to requiring this specific legend, the Act also in-
33. Green, 391 F.2d at 99.
34. Id. at 106.
35. Id.
36. Green, 409 F.2d at 1166. The court affirmed the judgments of the lower court based
upon the principles set out by Judge Simpson's dissent. See Green, 391 F.2d at 111, 113.
37. Pub. L. No. 89-92, 79 Stat. 282 (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1331-1340 (Supp. I 1965 &
Supp. V 1965-1969)).
38. 15 U.S.C. § 1333 (1970).
39. Id. § 1331. Section 1331 of the Code of 1970 provides that:
It is the policy of the Congress, and the purpose of this chapter, to establish a com-
prehensive Federal program to deal with cigarette labeling and advertising with re-
spect to any relationship between smoking and health, whereby-
(1) the public may be adequately informed that cigarette smoking may be hazard-
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cluded a preemption provision barring the requirement of any other
statement relating to health and smoking.40
In 1969, the Federal Trade Commission ("FTC") proposed a rule regu-
lating cigarette advertising that required all advertisements to enumerate
specific diseases caused by smoking.4 At the same time, the Federal
Communications Commission ("FCC") proposed a ban on radio and tele-
vision advertising of cigarettes.42 In 1970 in response to these proposals,
Congress enacted a statutory ban on television and radio advertising,"'
and amended the necessary warning label. The new label required the
following statement: "Warning: The Surgeon General Has Determined
That Cigarette Smoking Is Dangerous To Your Health."'44 The word
"warning" replaced the word "caution," and the label firmly stated that
smoking is dangerous; thus the tentative message of the 1965 warning was
replaced by a definitive assertion of danger.
In 1984, the Act was amended a final time by the Comprehensive
Smoking Education Act.45 This Amendment requires that four explicit,
ous to health by inclusion of a warning to that effect on each package of cigarettes;
and
(2) commerce and the national economy may be (A) protected to the maximum
extent consistent with this declared policy and (B) not impeded by diverse,
nonuniform, and confusing cigarette labeling and advertising regulations with respect
to any relationship between smoking and health.
Id.
40. The Act provided that:
(a) No statement relating to smoking and health, other than the statement required
by section 4 of this Act, shall be required on any cigarette package.
(b) No statement relating to smoking and health shall be required in the advertis-
ing of any cigarettes the packages of which are labeled in conformity with the provi-
sions of this Act.
Pub. L. No. 89-92, § 5, 79 Stat. 282, 283 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1334 (Supp. I 1965 & Supp.
V 1965-1969)).
For a discussion of the preemption issue as an affirmative defense to plaintiff recovery, see
infra notes 85-136 and accompanying text. On this issue, Senator Magnuson stated that:
[Labeling requirements] should be uniform; otherwise, a multiplicity of State and
local regulations pertaining to labeling of cigarette packages could create chaotic mar-
keting conditions. Thus, the committee bill, by preempting the field, precludes any
Federal, State, or local authority from requiring any warning statement other than
that required by this bill on cigarette packages.
111 CONG. REc. § 13,893 (daily ed. June 16, 1965) (statement of Sen. Magnuson).
41. See 34 Fed. Reg. 7917 (1969) (proposed May 20, 1969).
42. See 34 Fed. Reg. 1959 (1969) (proposed Feb. 11, 1969).
43. 15 U.S.C. § 1335 (1970). The ban is still in effect today. 15 U.S.C. § 1335 (1982).
44. 15 U.S.C. § 1333 (1970). Additionally, Congress reiterated its preemptive intent, stat-
ing that "the committee feels that it is incumbent on the Congress to act on the reported
legislation in order to prevent intrusion by the Federal Communications Commission and
the Federal Trade Commission into basic areas of policymaking which it has reserved to
itself." H.R. REP. No. 289, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1969).
45. Pub. L. No. 98-474, 98 Stat. 2200 (1984) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1331-
1341 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986)).
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rotational warnings be placed on cigarettes packages. 46 Reflecting the
growing recognition of and concern for the health hazards of smoking,
these new labels clearly warn of specific diseases caused by cigarette
smoking.
C. Modern Litigation
As late as 1974, the problems of proof for a plaintiff in a suit against a
tobacco company were thought to be "insurmountable. '47 As noted previ-
ously, a major obstacle for the earlier plaintiffs was their inability to
prove that the tobacco companies could have reasonably foreseen the
harmful effects of cigarette smoking.48 However, the foreseeability hurdle
of the early days has been removed by the widespread recognition that
smoking is the primary cause of numerous diseases. At issue today is the
extent of the manufacturer's duty to warn, the adequacy or inadequacy of
the warnings given, and whether any warranties were breached. Specifi-
cally, plaintiffs allege that the warnings given are inadequate, that adver-
tisements nullified the warnings given by discounting the risks associated
with smoking, or that express warranties have been breached by misrep-
resentation of the risks of smoking.4 9
In recent litigation, plaintiffs have attempted to recover under a theory
based on inadequate warning by asserting defective design claims. Plain-
tiffs are relying on section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts to
prove that the manufacturer's cigarettes are defective and unreasonably
dangerous to the health of consumers.50 Initially, design defect theories
46. 15 U.S.C. § 1333(a)(1) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986). This section provides that:
It shall be unlawful for any person to manufacture, package, or import for sale or
distribution within the United States any cigarettes the package of which fails to
bear, in accordance with the requirements of this section, one of the following labels:
SURGEON GENERAL'S WARNING: Smoking Causes Lung Cancer, Heart Disease,
Emphysema, And May Complicate Pregnancy.
SURGEON GENERAL'S WARNING: Quitting Smoking Now Greatly Reduces Seri-
ous Risks to Your Health.
SURGEON GENERAL'S WARNING: Smoking By Pregnant Women May Result in
Fetal Injury, Premature Birth, And Low Birth Weight.
SURGEON GENERAL'S WARNING: Cigarette Smoke Contains Carbon Monoxide.
47. See Garner, supra note 7, at 1427.
48. See supra notes 17-24 and accompanying text.
49. See, e.g., Stephen v. American Brands, Inc., 825 F.2d 312 (11th Cir. 1987); Gunsalus
v. Celotex Corp., 674 F. Supp. 1149 (E.D. Pa. 1987); Palmer v. Liggett Group, Inc., 633 F.
Supp. 1171 (D. Mass. 1986), rev'd, 825 F.2d 620 (1st Cir. 1987); Roysdon v. R.J. Reynolds
Tobacco Co., 623 F. Supp. 1189 (E.D. Tenn. 1985), aff'd, 849 F.2d 230 (6th Cir. 1988); Cipol-
lone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 593 F. Supp. 1146 (D.N.J. 1984), rev'd in part and remanded,
789 F.2d 181 (3d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 487 (1987).
50. RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) oF ToRTs § 402A (1977); see, e.g., Miller v. Brown & Wil-
liamson Tobacco Corp., 679 F. Supp. 485 (E.D. Pa. 1988); Gunsalus v. Celotex Corp., 674 F.
Supp. 1149 (E.D. Pa. 1987); Roysdon v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 623 F. Supp. 1189 (E.D.
Tenn. 1985), afl'd, 849 F.2d 230 (6th Cir. 1988).
1989]
264 UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 23:257
are attractive because the injured plaintiff is not required to prove "fault"
by the defendant. The defect in the product itself is the fault upon which
liability is based." In cigarette suits the defect generally is said to be
either the lack of a warning or an inadequate warning of the risks of
smoking. However, design defect claims have consistently been unsuccess-
ful, and courts continue to be reluctant to impose the duty of absolute
insurer upon cigarette manufacturers. Ironically, this reluctance originally
was founded on the "unknowable" nature of the risks associated with
smoking. Now, the courts' reluctance to impose the duty is founded on
the widespread knowledge of these same risks.
The problems for a plaintiff pursuing a defective design claim are nu-
merous. First, comment i to section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of
Torts states that "unreasonably dangerous" within the context of section
402A means that:
The article sold must be dangerous to an extent beyond that which would
be contemplated by the ordinary consumer who purchases it, with the ordi-
nary knowledge common to the community as to its characteristics....
Good tobacco is not unreasonably dangerous merely because the effects of
smoking may be harmful; but tobacco containing something like marijuana
may be unreasonably dangerous.5 '
A potential problem for plaintiffs is immediately apparent: comment i
clearly states that good tobacco is not unreasonably dangerous. Although
the meaning of "good tobacco" is somewhat ambiguous, it appears to
mean tobacco unadulterated with contaminants or foreign objects." Spe-
Section 402A of the Second Restatement of Torts states:
§ 402A. Special Liability of Seller of Product for Physical Harm to User or Consumer
(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to the
user or consumer or to his property is subject to liability for physical harm thereby
caused to the ultimate user or consumer, or to his property, if
(a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a product, and
(b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer without substantial
change in the condition in which it is sold.
(2) The rule stated in Subsection (1) applies although
(a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation and sale of his prod-
uct, and
(b) the user or consumer has not bought the product from or entered into any
contractual relation with the seller.
51. E. SWARTZ, PROOF OF PRODuCT DEFECT § 2:1 (1985). A defect has been said to be
"anything that is wrong with a product-which is causally connected with the injury com-
plained of." Id.
52. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A comment i (1977) (emphasis added).
53. This meaning is derived from the explanation in comment i of § 402A. According to
comment i, an example of tobacco that might be unreasonably dangerous is tobacco contain-
ing marijuana. Additionally, courts have not been hesitant to impose liability when foreign
objects have been found in products. See, e.g., Liggett & Myers Tobacco Co. v. Rankin, 246
Ky. 65, 54 S.W.2d 612 (1932) (worms); Pillars v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 117 Miss. 490,
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cifically, comment i states that good tobacco is not unreasonably danger-
ous simply because the effects of smoking are harmful.5 ' In fact, early
courts held that cigarettes were not unreasonably dangerous merely be-
cause the effects of smoking were harmful.15 Pritchard v. Liggett & Myers
Tobacco Co.56 clearly expressed that an inquiry into an unreasonably dan-
gerous condition is based upon the "purity" aspect of the product:
If a man buys whiskey and drinks too much of it and gets some liver trouble
as a result I do not think the manufacturer is liable unless (1) the manufac-
turer tells the customer the whiskey will not hurt him or (2) the whiskey is
adulterated whiskey-made with methyl alcohol, for instance. The same
surely is true of one who churns and sells butter to a customer who should
be on a nonfat diet. The same is true, likewise, as to one who roasts and
sells salted peanuts to a customer who should be on a no-salt diet. Surely if
the butter and the peanuts are pure there is no liability if the cholesterol
count rises dangerously.5 7
Thus, even under the strict liability theory of section 402A, liability is
not easily proved by plaintiffs. As in past cases, illness caused by smoking
a defendant's product does not necessarily mean that the product was
defective. As late as 1988, the court in Roysdon v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco
Co. 5 8 stated that in order for the product to be defective, there must be
evidence that the use of the defendant's cigarettes imposes greater risks
than those known to be associated with smoking. 9
Another factor bearing on the reluctance to hold manufacturers strictly
liable may be the typically excessive consumption of cigarettes by the ma-
jority of plaintiffs. For example, the plaintiff in Ross v. Philip Morris &
Co.6 0 smoked between two and four packs of cigarettes a day." The plain-
tiff in R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. Hudson6 2 smoked a tin of Prince
78 So. 365 (1918) (human toe); Corum v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 205 N.C. 213, 171 S.E.
78 (1933) (fishhook). Judge Simpson, of the 5th Circuit, stated the proposition that:
We are not dealing with an obvious, harmful, foreign body in a product. Neither do
we have an exploding or breaking bottle case wherein the defect is so obvious that it
warrants no discussion. Instead, we have a product (cigarettes) that is in no way de-
fective. They are exactly like all others of the particular brand and virtually the same
as all other brands on the market.
Green v. American Tobacco Co., 391 F.2d 97, 110 (5th Cir. 1968) (Simpson, J., dissenting).
54. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF ToRTs § 402A comment i.
55. Plaintiffs have also failed to recover due to the preemption of state tort claims by
the 1965 Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act. For a discussion of the preemp-
tion issue, see infra notes 85-136 and accompanying text.
56. 295 F.2d 292 (3rd Cir. 1961).
57. Id. at 302 (Goodrich, J., concurring).
58. 849 F.2d 230 (6th Cir. 1988).
59. Id. at 236.
60. 328 F.2d 3 (8th Cir. 1964).
61. Id. at 5.
62. 314 F.2d 776 (5th Cir. 1963).
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Albert and two packs of Camel cigarettes every day,63 and medical ex-
perts stated that his cancer was caused by "excessive" smoking.64 The
plaintiff in Lartigue v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co.,65 who began smoking
when he was nine years old, smoked for fifty-five years. He smoked at
least two packs a day, lighting one cigarette from the other, and even his
wife termed him a "cigarette fiend." 66 In Stephen v. American Brands,
Inc.,6" the plaintiff smoked for fifty-four years.6 8 In Gunsalus v. Celotex
Corp.,6 9 the plaintiff began smoking when he was eleven years old 0 and
was warned as early as 1954 to stop smoking.71 The extreme intemperate-
ness of all these plaintiffs may make it difficult to hold the cigarette man-
ufacturer to an insurer standard. Comment j of section 402A of the Re-
statement (Second) of Torts, states:
[A] seller is not required to warn with respect to products, or ingredients in
them, which are only dangerous, or potentially so, when consumed in exces-
sive quantity, or over a long period of time, when the danger, or potentiality
of danger, is generally known and recognized. Again the dangers of alcoholic
beverages are an example, as are also those of foods containing such sub-
stances as saturated fats, which may over a period of time have a deleteri-
ous effect upon the human heart.72
The excesses to which these plaintiffs smoked may leave a court and jury
justifiably wary of allowing the plaintiff to escape responsibility for their
own actions by forcing cigarette manufacturers into the role of absolute
insurers.
Integrally related to claims of design defect are claims of failure to
warn. In fact, some cigarette plaintiffs have alleged that the lack or inade-
quacy of a warning constitutes a design defect.73 A duty to warn is said to
exist when a manufacturer has superior knowledge, and "may reasonably
foresee a danger of injury or damage to one less knowledgeable." 4 This
duty persists unless an appropriate warning of the risks involved is
given.715 Furthermore, a manufacturer with a duty to warn also has a duty
to insure that the warnings given are adequate."6 A warning may be inad-
63. Id. at 778.
64. Id. at 779.
65. 317 F.2d 19 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 865 (1963).
66. Id. at 22.
67. 825 F.2d 312 (11th Cir. 1987).
68. Id. at 313.
69. 674 F. Supp. 1149 (E.D. Pa. 1987).
70. Id. at 1151.
71. Id. at 1153.
72. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A comment j (1977).
73. See, e.g., Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 649 F. Supp. 664, 669-71 (D.N.J. 1986).
74. 3 AMERICAN LAW OF PRoDucTs LIABILITY § 33:2 (3d ed. 1987).
75. Id.
76. Id. § 34:1.
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equate if no specific risks are mentioned or if the warnings are ambigu-
ous."' Thus, a warning may be inadequate if the language of the warning
is not commensurate with the gravity of the harm likely to result from
the danger.7 8 Alternatively, a warning which might otherwise be sufficient
may be nullified by a marketing plan which diminishes the importance of
the warnings given.7 9 Plaintiffs have historically failed to prevail on this
latter theory80 primarily because of their inability to prove justifiable reli-
ance and a causal connection between the manufacturer's advertisements
or representations and the alleged harm suffered.
Failure to warn theories have consistently met with difficulty, as evi-
denced by the lack of recovery by plaintiffs proceeding under this the-
ory.81 The most formidable problem presented is the possible preemption
of all state claims arising from post-1966 smoking due to the promulga-
tion of the Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act.82 Thus, the
failure to warn theory is completely unavailable to many plaintiffs who
began smoking after 1966. Other significant problems presented by the
theory include establishing that the tobacco companies knew of the dan-
gers caused by smoking before 1966 and showing that the plaintiff was
unaware of the dangers involved in smoking.
Ironically, modern plaintiffs are disadvantaged by being warned too
well: widespread community knowledge of the risks associated with smok-
ing coupled with the specific warnings required by the Act make the
77. See, e.g., Gunsalus v. Celotex Corp., 674 F. Supp. 1149 (E.D. Pa. 1987).
78. See Borel v. Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp., 493 F.2d 1076 (5th Cir. 1973) (asbestos
manufacturer's duty to warn of foreseeable dangers extends to all users and consumers),
cert. denied, 419 U.S. 869 (1974). The court stated that:
[N]one of these so-called 'cautions' intimated the gravity of the risk: the danger of a
fatal illness caused by asbestosis and mesothelioma or other cancers. The mild sug-
gestion that inhalation of asbestos in excessive quantities over a long period of time
'may be harmful' conveys no idea of the extent of the danger.
Id. at 1104 (emphasis in original).
79. Wrubel, Liability for Failure to Warn or Instruct, in CONSUMR PRODUCTS: GOVERN-
MENT REGULATION AND PRODUCT LmrILITY 11 (1984). Generally, a warning is said to be ade-
quate when it is "reasonably calculated to reach the ultimate user of a product, a reasonably
prudent consumer, or an ordinary user, and must be calculated to bring home to a reasona-
bly prudent user of the product the nature and extent of the danger involved in using the
product." 3 AmERICAN LAW OF PRODUCTs LIABILrrY, supra note 74, § 34:4.
80. See, e.g., Gunsalus, 674 F. Supp. 1149 (advertisements were not the kind upon which
reasonable people would rely). But see Hon v. Stroh Brewery Co., Prod. Liab. Rep. (CCH)
11,609 (Dec. 21, 1987) (Stroh's marketing of its product would be an important considera-
tion for the jury in determining whether an express warning was necessary to make the
product safe for its intended purpose); Baldino v. Castagna, 505 Pa. 239, 478 A.2d 807
(1984) (jury may consider whether a manufacturer has nullified warning by promotion of its
product).
81. Even the plaintiff in Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 693 F. Supp. 208 (D.N.J. 1988),
the first plaintiff to recover in a product liability suit against a tobacco company, failed to
recover on the failure to warn claim.
82. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1331-1341 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
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plaintiff's failure to warn claim difficult to support."' A manufacturer gen-
erally is not held liable for harm caused by its product to a plaintiff who
actually knew and appreciated the risk posed yet voluntarily proceeded to
encounter that risk. Furthermore, the manufacturer's affirmative defense
of assumption of risk is enhanced. 4
III. FAILURE TO WARN AND THE PREEMPTION BAR: THE REAL
SIGNIFICANCE OF Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc.
A. Preemption by the Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act
Although claims of lack of foreseeability of the dangers involved in
smoking insulated defendants in earlier cases from failure to warn claims,
the current widespread recognition of the risks posed by smoking pre-
vents use of the lack of foreseeability defense. Instead, tobacco companies
are relying on their compliance with the Federal Cigarette Labeling and
Advertising Act 5 to preempt state tort claims. To date, this defense has
succeeded against claims due to smoking after the effective date of the
Act. Preemption thus creates serious problems for plaintiffs: it may extin-
guish a failure to warn claim altogether, and it presents difficulties in
proving injuries and apportioning damages when a plaintiff is restricted
to pre-1966 smoking related injuries. Since a finding of preemption effec-
tively bars recovery for injuries resulting from post-1966 smoking, the vi-
ability of the preemption defense assumes ever-increasing importance.
Passage of the Act has had a profound effect on the outcome of every
suit filed against a cigarette manufacturer since its adoption. In the latest
wave of cigarette suits, the Act has consistently prevented plaintiffs from
recovering for injuries that occurred as a result of smoking after the Act's
adoption. The Act effectively prevents recovery on a failure to warn claim
in two ways. First, the Act specifies explicit warnings which manufactur-
ers must place on every package of cigarettes."' The specificity of these
warnings has not only impeded a plaintiff's claim of failure to warn, but it
also leaves the plaintiff vulnerable to the manufacturer's claim of assump-
tion of risk. Second, the presence of the federally mandated warnings
makes it uncertain whether a plaintiff may even bring a tort claim under
state law, for the Act may preempt state claims based on failure to warn.
83. As early as 1978, studies showed that 90% of the American public was aware that
cigarette smoking was hazardous. Note, supra note 1, at 813-14.
84. Plaintiffs may be able to avoid this defense if they can show addiction. Addiction
makes a plaintiff's decision to smoke less voluntary. Since the assumption of risk defense
depends on voluntary activity by the plaintiff, a manufacturer's defense claims may then
lose some of their force. Note, supra note 1, at 813-14. For a discussion of addiction as a
possible theory of recovery, see generally Garner, supra note 7, at 1431.
85. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1331-1341 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
86. For the language required in the warnings, see supra note 46 and accompanying text.
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The source of the preemption doctrine is found in the supremacy clause
of the United States Constitution."' Congress may evince its desire to pre-
empt by using express language of preemption,88 or it may inpliedly pre-
empt a field.8 9 Implied preemption may occur when, through the compre-
hensiveness of the regulatory scheme, Congress manifests an intent to
completely occupy a given field.90 Implied preemption may also occur
when state law conflicts with federal law even though Congress has not
displaced state law entirely. 1 Such a conflict may arise when it becomes
physically impossible to comply with both federal and state regulations92
or when state law presents an obstacle to the accomplishment of the full
purposes and objectives of Congress. 3
It is generally agreed that the Act does not expressly preempt state law
tort claims.9 ' Therefore, the Act must be examined to discern congres-
sional intent in determining whether implied preemption exists. In sec-
tion 1331 of the Act, Congress addressed the two, sometimes competing,
goals of public health and protection of the national economy. Section
1331 provides that:
It is the policy of the Congress, and the purpose of this chapter, to establish
a comprehensive Federal program to deal with cigarette labeling and adver-
tising with respect to any relationship between smoking and health,
whereby-
(1) the public may be adequately informed that cigarette smoking may be
hazardous to health by inclusion of a warning to that effect on each package
of cigarettes; and
(2) commerce and the national economy may be (A) protected to the maxi-
mum extent consistent with this declared policy and (B) not impeded by
diverse, nonuniform, and confusing cigarette labeling and advertising regu-
lations with respect to any relationship between smoking and health.9 5
Congress has clearly expressed its purpose to not only adequately in-
87. U.S. CONsT. art. VI, § 2.
88. See, e.g., Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519, 525 (1977).
89. Id.
90. Silkwood v. Kerr McGee Corp., 464 U.S. 238, 248 (1984).
91. Id. at 248 (citing Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142-43
(1963)).
92. Id.
93. See, e.g., Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52 (1941).
94. See, e.g., Roysdon v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 849 F.2d 230 (6th Cir. 1988);
Palmer v. Liggett Group, Inc., 635 F. Supp. 392 (D. Mass. 1984).
95. 15 U.S.C. § 1331 (1982). In 1984, Congress again amended § 1331(1), requiring warn-
ings on cigarette advertisements. Section 1331(1) now provides that "the public may be ade-
quately informed about any adverse health effects of cigarette smoking by inclusion of warn-
ing notices on each package of cigarettes and in each advertisement of cigarettes." 15 U.S.C.
§ 1331(1) (Supp. I 1984).
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form the public of the hazards of cigarette smoking"6 but also to protect
commerce by prohibiting "diverse, nonuniform, and confusing cigarette
labeling." Thus, the information to be received by the public must be
controlled in such a way as to prevent the impediment of commerce
through diverse labeling and advertising requirements. The controlled ap-
proach to the dissemination of information to the public is reflected in
the four rotational warnings most recently adopted by Congress for use in
labeling cigarette packages. Through these four explicit warnings, Con-
gress has expressed its view of what constitutes adequate warning. The
articulation of the specific warnings accomplishes Congress' primary goal
of informing the public of health hazards. The prohibition against requir-
ing any other statement relating to smoking and health accomplishes the
second expressed purpose of protecting commerce through uniform regu-
lations. The preemption provision found in section 1334 of the Act ap-
pears to be the method Congress has chosen to insure that the second
goal is met. Section 1334 provides that:
(a) No statement relating to smoking and health, other than the statement
required by section 1333 of this title, shall be required on any cigarette
package.
(b) No requirement or prohibition based on smoking and health shall be
imposed under State law with respect to the advertising or promotion of
any cigarettes the packages of which are labeled in conformity with the pro-
visions of this chapter.9 7
Although section 1334 clearly prohibits requiring statements other than
those contained in section 1333, plaintiffs have argued that common law
claims were not meant to be included under this category of preempted
activities.
B. Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc.
1. Generally
On June 13, 1988, the jury in Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc."s re-
turned the first verdict ever awarded against a tobacco company in a
products liability suit.9 Although hailed by some as the end of the to-
96. The report issued by the Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce stated
that: "The principal purpose of the bill is to provide adequate warning to the public of the
potential hazards of cigarette smoking by requiring the labeling of cigarette packages with
the [warning]." H.R. REP. No. 449, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 1, reprinted in 1965 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 2350.
97. 15 U.S.C. § 1334 (1982).
98. 693 F. Supp. 208 (D.N.J. 1988).
99. This verdict represents the first award to a plaintiff in approximately 300 cigarette




bacco companies' "winning streak,"' 0 Cipollone may actually present se-
vere obstacles to any subsequent victory by plaintiffs.
The plaintiff in Cipollone, who had smoked for over forty years,
brought a state common-law products liability action against three to-
bacco companies' 011 seeking to recover for the lung cancer she had alleg-
edly contracted as a result of smoking the defendants' cigarettes. Rose
Cipollone originally alleged claims of strict liability, including design de-
fect and failure to warn, intentional tort, including the negligent or inten-
tional advertising of products which neutralized the warnings actually
given, negligence, and breach of warranty." 2 Early on, these claims were
dealt a severe blow by the Third Circuit Court's finding of preemption by
the Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act. As a result of this
finding, the majority of Cipollone's claims were dismissed. Of the surviv-
ing claims, the jury awarded no money damages for the failure to warn
claim even though they found the manufacturer, Liggett, liable for failing
to warn. Damages were awarded to Mr. Cipollone on a finding that Lig-
gett had breached express warranties made through advertisements to
Mrs. Cipollone.' 0 3
The outcome of Cipollone is meaningful in several respects. The rela-
tively small amount awarded may indicate that the jurors did not hold
Liggett liable in any significant way. It is particularly notable that Rose
Cipollone's estate failed to recover any damages, since the jurors found
her primarily responsible for her illness. It appears that Rose Cipollone
illustrates the principal problem modern cigarette plaintiffs encounter,
that of being warned too well of the dangers of cigarette smoking. Since
Rose Cipollone continued to smoke after she was aware of the potential
hazards, the jury found that she had voluntarily encountered a known
risk. Evident in the jury's finding is the difficulty of apportioning claims
and damages between pre-1966 smoking and post-1966 smoking. The ju-
rors appear to have considered Rose Cipollone's post-1966 behavior in de-
termining damages for her pre-1966 failure to warn claim. However, in
spite of these adverse findings, the jury did find that Liggett owed a duty
to warn, and that it breached express warranties. These findings may help
future plaintiffs, although the problem of plaintiff conduct will likely
again hamper plaintiff recovery.
2. Preemption in Cipollone
The road to recovery in Cipollone was long and expensive. Almost four
100. Id.
101. The plaintiff originally named as defendants Liggett, Philip Morris, Inc., and Loril-
lard, Inc. All claims were dismissed against the latter two. Cipollone, 693 F. Supp. at 210.
102. Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 593 F. Supp. 1146, 1149 (D.N.J. 1984).
103. Cipolone, 693 F. Supp. at 210.
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years elapsed from the first proceeding to the recent jury award of
$400,000, and plaintiff's counsel spent more than $2,000,000 in prepara-
tion.04 The journey was also fraught with obstacles, the resolution of
which may bode ill for future plaintiffs.
The first, and perhaps most important obstacle in the Cipolone pro-
ceedings, was the assertion by the defendants that the plaintiff's claims
were preempted by the Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act.10 5
After an exhaustive analysis of the Act, the district court concluded that
the Act neither expressly nor impliedly preempted plaintiff's claims. 06
Central to this finding was the court's position that determination of the
preemption question required analysis of the legislative history of the
Act. ' Consequently, both parties provided passages supportive of their
respective positions,'0 8 but the court was persuaded by the plaintiff's
arguments.
In the first proceeding, Rose Cipollone conceded that the Act precluded
state and government regulation of labeling and advertising, but argued
that her common law claims would not constitute regulation of cigarette
labeling and advertising.'0 9 Instead, she argued that her claims consti-
tuted compensation for the harmful effects of smoking, and that therefore
the claims should not be preempted."0 Further, she stressed that had
Congress intended to eliminate state claims, it would have clearly done
so."' In response, the defendants asserted that had Congress intended to
allow state claims, it would have provided a savings clause as it had done
in many other statutes.-"
In finding that the Act did not expressly preempt plaintiff's common-
law claims, the court analyzed whether a conflict existed between the im-
position of state tort liability and federal legislation by distinguishing
"regulation" from "motivation." The court reasoned that "[t]ort liability
.. .merely 'motivates' a. . .business entity to act or refrain from acting
by creating certain financial incentives. . . .[T]ort liability does not reg-
ulate at all; it merely creates some probability of changing the behavior of
those upon whom it imposes liability, and without dictating the form of
such change.""' Therefore, the court found that state tort liability was
not inconsistent with the regulatory purposes of the federal Act.
104. See Rosenblum, supra note 4, at 1369.
105. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1331-1341 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
106. Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 593 F. Supp. 1146, 1170 (D.N.J. 1984).
107. Id. at 1154.
108. Id. at 1153-63.
109. Id. at 1153.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 1154.
113. Id. at 1156.
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Although the court recognized that the legislative history of the Act
indicates an intent "to avoid a 'maze of conflicting regulations' and deal
with 'a product that is completely in interstate commerce,' "114 the court
also found that no implied preemption existed. The court agreed with
Liggett that Congress intended to occupy a field, but stated that this field
did not encompass state law products liability claims.1 5 Rather, the court
held that this field was limited to cigarette labeling and advertising. The
intent to occupy did not extend to the problem of compensating "vic-
tims" of smoking.1 6 The court further stated that the payment of com-
pensation did not create an actual conflict with the Act.117 Therefore, the
district court held that the plaintiff had the right to present her claims
for adjudication.""
In what has proven to be a significant ruling, the Third Circuit Court of
Appeals reversed the district court's findings on the preemption issue.1
Although the circuit court agreed with the district court that there was no
express preemption in the Act, 20 it did find that implied preemption ex-
isted. Unlike the district court, the circuit court found it unnecessary to
refer to the Act's legislative history to determine Congress' intent to pre-
empt.' 2' The court did agree that Congress intended to occupy a field.
However, rather than conclude that this field was completely separate
from the Cipollones' state tort claims, the court concluded that all of the
state law claims which actually conflicted with the Act were preempted.' 22
In determining which claims actually conflicted, the circuit court ex-
amined the preemption provision of section 1334 in conjunction with the
statement of purpose found in section 1331. 21 In contrast, the district
court had examined these provisions independently." 4 The circuit court
found that "the duties imposed through state common-law damage ac-
tions have the effect of requirements that are capable of creating 'an ob-
stacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and
objectives of Congress.' 125 Citing several United States Supreme Court
decisions,"62 the circuit court found that state law damage claims had a
114. Id. at 1164.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 1170.
118. Id. at 1171.
119. Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 789 F.2d 181 (3d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct.
487 (1987).
120. Id. at 185.
121. Id. at 186.
122. Id. at 187.
123. Id.
124. See Cipollone, 593 F. Supp. at 1153-65.
125. Cipollone, 789 F.2d at 187.
126. E.g., Fidelity Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. De La Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141 (1982); Chicago
& N.W. Transp. Co. v. Kalo Brick & Tile Co., 450 U.S. 311 (1981); San Diego Bldg. Trades
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regulatory effect, as well as the potential for frustrating congressional
objectives. Consequently, the court concluded that successful claims re-
sulting from smoking or noncompliance with warning obligations other
than those prescribed in the Act would actually conflict with the Act. 2 ' A
successful state claim would in effect heighten the requirements placed on
manufacturers by punishing them despite compliance with federal stan-
dards."2 8 Further, the court held that where the success of a state law
claim depends on the assertion that a duty exists to provide warnings in
addition to those required by the Act, the claims will be preempted as
conflicting with the Act." 9
The circuit court remanded the case to the district court for a determi-
nation of which claims were preempted, based upon the circuit court's
rationale. The district court was instructed by the circuit court to hold as
preempted all state claims relating to "advertising or promotion" or
claims which necessarily depended on establishing that a greater duty to
warn existed than that imposed by Congress."' The district court found
preemption of all but one of the claims arising from post-1966 smoking.
Preempted were the strict liability claims (including failure to warn and
design defect),"' intentional tort claims (including the claim that the
manufacturers intentionally misled the public and/or deprived it of the
information necessary to make an informed decision about smoking),' 3
and the breach of express warranty claim. 3' The ramifications of such a
Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236 (1959).
127. Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 789 F.2d 181, 187 (3d Cir. 1986).
128. However, there are cases holding that mere compliance with a federal statute does
not protect manufacturers from liability. See, e.g., Ferebee v. Chevron Chem. Co., 736 F.2d
1529 (D.C. Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1062 (1985) (labeling paraquat with the warning
required under the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act does not preclude a
jury from finding the defendant's warning inadequate); Stevens v. Parke, Davis & Co., 9 Cal.
3d 51, 507 P.2d 653, 107 Cal. Rptr. 45 (1973) (compliance with Food and Drug Administra-
tion warnings not sufficient to immunize manufacturer from liability); MacDonald v. Ortho
Pharmaceutical Corp., 394 Mass. 131, 475 N.E.2d 65 (1985) (jury could conclude that warn-
ing was inadequate even though it complied with the labeling requirements of the Food and
Drug Administration); Burch v. Amsterdam Corp., 366 A.2d 1079 (D.C. 1976) (compliance
with labeling requirements of Federal Hazardous Substances Act does not immunize manu-
facturers from liability because defective warning was inadequate even though it complied
with the labeling requirements of the Food and Drug Administration); see also RESTATE-
MENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 288C (1977) ("Compliance with a legislative enactment or an
administrative regulation does not prevent a finding of negligence where a reasonable man
would take additional precautions.").
129. Cipollone, 789 F.2d at 187. Since a plaintiff must allege that additional warnings
are necessary for the manufacturer to properly discharge his duty to warn in order to cir-
cumvent the inevitable defense of assumption of risk, this holding effectively forecloses a
plaintiff's recovery in a cigarette suit.
130. Id.
131. Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 649 F. Supp. 664, 669-72 (D.N.J. 1986).
132. Id. at 673-74.
133. Id. at 675.
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finding are far-reaching. A majority of the plaintiff's claims may be sum-
marily eliminated for injuries caused by smoking after the Act became
effective. Thus, Mrs. Cipollone's case was severely limited by the preemp-
tion ruling.
The Third Circuit's preemption finding appears well-supported. Pre-
emption by the Act has been unanimously found by other federal courts
considering its applicability in products liability actions against cigarette
manufacturers. 13  The Act specifies four explicit warnings to be used. It
does not state that other warnings may be used in place of these four, or
in addition to them. Instead, its parameters are specifically delimited by
section 1334. In addition, the evolutionary process of the current warn-
ings indicates that the Act represents congressional intent to set firm
bounds in the area of cigarette labeling and advertising. The warnings
required by the Act have changed three times since its original adop-
tion.135 As the evidence mounted on the risks associated with cigarette
smoking, the required warnings changed in tone and content. The hesi-
tancy of the first warning was replaced with disclosure of specific diseases
caused by cigarette smoking. Old warnings were replaced when they no
longer adequately informed the public of the health hazards.
Based on Congress' previous amendment of the Act, it appears that
until the current warnings are again amended, they must be presumed to
contain "adequate information" sufficient to accomplish the stated goals.
Thus, plaintiffs who bring state claims based on inadequate warnings are
attempting to impose, through state channels, more stringent require-
ments upon cigarette manufacturers than are imposed by the federal
scheme. Since a state claim for compensation increases the requirements
placed on manufacturers, state claims conflict with the scheme expressed
in the federal Act. A successful state claim based on a failure to warn
theory implies that warnings in addition to or different from those re-
quired by the Act are necessary. Thus, a state begins to encroach upon
the boundaries of section 1334 by requiring supplemental warnings. Any
state law that actually conflicts with federal law is preempted.13 6 There-
fore, state claims arising from post-warning smoking should be
134. See, e.g., Stephen v. American Brands, Inc., 825 F.2d 312 (11th Cir. 1987);
Semowich v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., No. 86-CV-118, 1988 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9102
(N.D.N.Y. Aug. 18, 1988); Gunsalus v. Celotex Corp., 674 F. Supp. 1149 (E.D. Pa. 1987);
Palmer v. Liggett Group, Inc., 633 F. Supp. 1171 (D. Mass. 1986), rev'd, 825 F.2d 620 (1st
Cir. 1987); Roysdon v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 623 F. Supp. 1189 (E.D. Tenn. 1985);
Phillips v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., No. 1144, 1988 Tenn. App. LEXIS 312 (May 16,
1988). Only one court has ruled that preemption of state tort actions did not exist in a
cigarette suit. See Forster v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 423 N.W.2d 691 (Minn. Ct. App.
1988) (court refused to "strain to find implied preemption" when Congress did not explicitly
preempt state tort actions).
135. For the language required by each of these warnings, see supra note 46.
136. See supra notes 90-92 and accompanying text; see also U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2.
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preempted.
3. Recovery in Cipollone
The Third Circuit's preemption finding was the most important loss for
Rose Cipollone. The court's ruling drastically diminished her possible
claims for recovery. She was left only with claims arising from the defend-
ant's pre-1966 activity. Her potential for recovery was further curtailed
when the jury found that her knowledge and awareness of the risks asso-
ciated with cigarette smoking made her primarily responsible for her own
death.1 37
Although Mrs. Cipollone began smoking at the age of sixteen, 138 the
jury found that she was aware of the risks involved. Mrs. Cipollone had
testified that she heard reports that smoking caused cancer," 9 yet she
continued to smoke between one and two packs of cigarettes a day. She
continued to smoke even after her cancer was diagnosed and her lung was
removed. She stopped smoking only after her cancer had metastasized,
and she was found to be fatally ill in 1983.140 Based on these actions, the
jury found that Rose Cipollone knew what she was doing and smoked
because she wanted to smoke. In particular, a majority of the jury found
it significant that Rose Cipolone did not stop smoking in 1966 when the
federal warnings went into effect.'" The jury found that Rose Cipollone
had voluntarily and unreasonably encountered a known danger by smok-
ing cigarettes and held her eighty percent responsible for her own
death."4 Under New Jersey law, this finding of responsibility barred Rose
Cipollone from recovering on the failure to warn claim.14 3 However, al-
though she failed to recover monetary damages on the failure to warn
claim, the jury did find that Liggett had a duty to warn consumers of the
health risks of smoking, that Liggett failed to warn consumers, and that
this failure to warn proximately caused Mrs. Cipolone's illness.' Al-
though New Jersey's comparative fault law prevented Mrs. Cipollone
from recovering on her failure to warn claim, the jury's finding that a
duty to warn existed may prove important for plaintiffs of states without
comparative fault laws.
137. Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 693 F. Supp. 208, 210 (D.N.J. 1988). The defense
presented evidence on the history of tobacco use, and each juror received a notebook of over
300 articles that Rose Cipollone might have read concerning the risks of cigarette smoking.
See Singer, They Didn't Really Blame the Cigarette Makers, AM. LAW. 31, 32 (Sept. 1988).
138. Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 683 F. Supp. 1487, 1489 (D.N.J. 1988).
139. Id. at 1489.
140. Id. at 1490.
141. Singer, supra note 137, at 36.





The recovery granted by the Cipollone jury was based on a breach of
express warranty claim, founded on Mrs. Cipollone's contention that she
read and relied on advertisements that misrepresented the risks of smok-
ing.1 5 Even though the jury found that Liggett breached express warran-
ties made to Mrs. Cipollone, and that this breach proximately caused
Mrs. Cipollone's cancer and death, the award was made to Mr. Cipollone
rather than to Mrs. Cipollone's estate. Although apparently a promising
victory, the presence of inconsistent findings and a controversial jury
charge undermine the seeming win for cigarette plaintiffs. In effect, the
jury found that Mrs. Cipollone sustained no damages from this breach of
warranty, but that Mr. Cipollone, a non-smoker, did. The inconsistency of
this finding makes the significance of the verdict questionable. Addition-
ally, by expressly denying damages to the estate of Mrs. Cipollone, the
injured smoker, the jury appears to have emphatically denied plaintiff re-
covery once again. The justification for the award to Mr. Cipollone is un-
clear. It has been suggested that the award represented either "straight
sympathy"'46 for Mr. Cipollone, or simply a compromise among the ju-
rors, the majority of whom felt strongly about not awarding Mrs. Cipol-
lone any damages.141
Further clouding the impact of the verdict is the controversial jury
charge from Judge Sarokin stating that "[t]he law does not require plain-
tiff to show that Rose Cipollone specifically relied on Liggett's warran-
ties. 1 48 Although in an earlier proceeding the court had stated that reli-
ance was an element of plaintiffs express warranty claim,' 49 in the latest
proceeding the court noted that it had reconsidered this prior position. 50
The change in position on this issue is significant. By eliminating the reli-
ance requirement, Rose Cipollone's knowledge of the risks involved and
her continued smoking would not operate to bar this claim. If, however,
reliance was a requirement for a successful breach of express warranty
claim, it seems likely that the plaintiff would not have recovered. The
jury's reluctance to award damages on the failure to warn claim for ac-
tions which they found to be voluntary and unreasonable may have per-
sisted in the breach of warranty claim. It appears probable that Mrs. Ci-
pollone's smoking, which continued despite reports on the hazards of
smoking and after the federal warnings became effective, would have pre-
vented a finding of reliance and therefore precluded recovery.
145. Cipollone, 683 F. Supp. at 1497-99.
146. Adler, Confusing Conclusion to Cipollone, 121 NEw JERSEY L.J. 1368 (1988).
147. See Singer, supra note 137, at 36-37.
148. Cipollone, 693 F. Supp. at 212.
149. Cipollone, 683 F. Supp. at 1497.
150. Cipollone, 693 F. Supp. at 213.
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IV. CONCLUSION
The uncertainty surrounding the reliance charge and the likelihood
that the case would have been resolved differently, had reliance been re-
quired, undermines the significance of the award granted. The signifi-
cance of the award is further undermined by the fact that damages were
awarded to Mr. Cipollone, a non-smoker, rather than to Mrs. Cipolone,
the injured smoker. Thus, Cipollone may not be the important tort liabil-
ity win for cigarette plaintiffs that it initially appeared to be. Instead, it is
the leading judicial statement on the preemption issue, and it is this issue
which makes Cipollone significant in the area of tobacco litigation. Ironi-
cally, although Cipollone is the first case to award damages to a plaintiff,
it is also the case whose sweeping preemption rulings establish severe,
possibly "insurmountable," obstacles for future plaintiffs in tobacco suits.
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